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INTRODUCTION
New York courts have long embraced a posture of considerable judicial
restraint when passing upon the coordinating branches’ determinations of
blight in eminent domain cases. Notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme
Court’s controversial 2005 pronouncement in Kelo v. City of New London,1
after which forty-three states heeded the majority’s invitation to refine their
own laws to more strenuously protect private property rights,2 New York’s
government-permissive statutory scheme and solicitous judicial response
remains unchanged. As recently as the last judicial term, the New York

*

Peter W. Rodino Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. The author thanks participants
in the Fordham Urban Law Journal symposium on takings law for their helpful insights and
comments, and Jennifer Bennett, Paolo Bruno, and Javier Diaz for their invaluable research
assistance.
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. Justice Stevens, the architect of the majority’s ruling in Kelo, later viewed favorably
“the public outcry that greeted Kelo,” observing in a speech to a county bar association that
the backlash itself “is some evidence that the political process is up to the task of addressing” eminent domain reform. Justice John Paul Stevens, Judicial Predilections, Address to
the Clark County Bar Ass’n (Aug. 18, 2005), in 6 NEV. L.J. 1, 4 (2005).
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Court of Appeals, in Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp.3
and Goldstein v. Pataki,4 concluded that the Empire State Development
Corporation’s (ESDC’s) findings of blight must stand, unless patently irrational or baseless.5
In Kaur, the court afforded wholesale deference to the legislative body’s
characterization of relevant parts of West Harlem as “substantially unsafe,
unsanitary, substandard, and deteriorated,”6 notwithstanding the fact that
those characterizations rested in considerable part on the machinations of
the very enterprise—Columbia University—that would stand to gain from
the blight designation. The blight characterization inspired a host of vociferous objections.7 Nonetheless, the court deemed firm and immutable the
premise that the judicial branch must not substitute its judgment for that of
the legislatively designated agency.
Similarly, in Goldstein, the Atlantic Yards case, New York’s highest
court endorsed the condemnation of a residential community to make way
for a “mixed-use development” that was proposed by private developer
Forest City Ratner Companies (FCRC) for the benefit of that developer.8
The exercise of eminent domain would allow for the construction of a
3. 933 N.E.2d 721, 731 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y.
State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
4. 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
5. See id.; see also Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172
(N.Y. 2009).
6. Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 726.
7. See id. at 727; see also Maggie Astor & Kim Kirschenbaum, Court OKs Manhattanville Expansion, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR, June 24, 2010, available at http://www.columbia
spectator.com/2010/06/24/court-oks-expansion; Kim Kirschenbaum, Harlem Activists Seek
Eminent Domain Law Reform, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR, Oct. 18, 2010, available at http://ww
w.columbiaspectator.com/2010/10/18/harlem-activists-seek-eminent-domain-law-reform;
Kim Kirschenbaum, Property Holdouts Look to Supreme Court, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR,
Sept. 22, 2010, available at http://www.columbiaspectator.com/2010/09/22/property-hold
outs-look-supreme-court; More on Last Week’s Decision in Columbia Eminent Domain
Case, EMINENT DOMAIN LAW BLOG (June 29, 2010), http://ownerscounsel.blogspot.
com/2010/06/more-on-last-weeks-decision-in-columbia.html; Damon W. Root, Judicial Review of Eminent Domain in New York is Fundamentally Broken, REASON.COM (June 25,
2010), http://reason.com/blog/2010/06/25/judicial-review-of-eminent-dom; Robert Thomas,
New York Still Has “Unfrozen Caveman Judges” Who Are “Frightened and Confused” by
Eminent Domain Blight, INVERSECONDEMNATION (June 24, 2010), http://www.inverse
condemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2010/06/new-york-still-has-unfrozen-cavemanjudges-who-are-frightened-and-confused-by-blight.html; Robert Thomas, There Really Are
No Limits To Eminent Domain In New York—Court Of Appeals Reverses The Columbia
Case (Kaur), INVERSECONDEMNATION (June 24, 2010), http://www.inversecondemnation.
com/inversecondemnation/2010/06/there-really-are-no-limits-to-eminent-domain-in-newyork-court-of-appeals-reverses-the-columbia-case.html; Jonathan S. Torbin, New York’s
Eminent Domain “Blight” Grows, COMMENTARY MAGAZINE (June 24, 2010),
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/tobin/319631.
8. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 166, 175.
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sports arena to house the NBA Nets franchise.9 The court of appeals noted
that affected private property owners were “doubtless correct that the conditions cited in support of the blight finding at issue do not begin to approach in severity the dire circumstances of urban slum dwelling described” in earlier court precedent.10 Still, the court chose to defer wholewholesale to the agency’s determination of blight, concluding that once the
legislative agency has made its findings, absent a showing of corruption or
irrationality, “there is nothing for the courts to do about it.”11
New York’s expansive approach to government’s eminent domain powers is manifested in the generous two-fold classification process that its statutory scheme allows. Under the New York State Urban Development
Corporation Act (UDCA), a government agency may justify a taking of
private property if the property is determined to have fallen prey to
“blight,” or, in the alternative, if the land will be used in a manner that can
support its classification as a “civic project.”12 Blight designations are readily affirmed, as courts routinely defer to agency determinations. In the
rare instance that the agency is unable to demonstrate blight, the civic purpose classification serves as a catch-all, effectively assuring that the exercise of eminent domain will go forward. Kaur makes plain the extent of
the New York judiciary’s disinclination to enter the fray.13 There, the court
afforded the agency’s blight designation wholesale deference while simultaneously declining to disturb its subsidiary determination that the taking
for a private educational institution, Columbia University, qualified as a valid “civic project.”14
This Article asserts that the New York model must be recast to more effectively balance and vindicate the various equities that pit private property
rights against concerns for the greater good. In considerable measure, reinvention depends on the capacity of the courts to emerge as more meaningful participants in the colloquy between and among the coordinating
branches of government. The Kaur case in particular provides an object
lesson on the potential for abuse when agency determinations of blight are

9. Id. at 166.
10. Id. at 171; see also N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936) (developing the blight exception to the public use doctrine).
11. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172 (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 661
(N.Y. 1953)).
12. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW, Ch. 252, tit. 16, ch. 24, subch. 1, §§ 6251-6292 (McKinney
2010).
13. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied
sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
14. Id. at 733.
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allowed to rest, unchecked, on the machinations of the enterprise that is advancing that designation in the first place.15
In the Kaur matter, Columbia University spent the better part of a decade quietly buying up considerable properties that would come to be within
the scope of its proposed expansion, only to then allow those properties to
fall into disrepair.16 As the New York Appellate Division noted angrily,
“Manhattanville or West Harlem as a matter of record was not in a depressed economic condition when EDC and ESDC embarked on their Columbia-prepared-and-financed quest.”17 Specifically, after purchasing or
acquiring control of the properties in the designated area—vacating seventeen buildings and more than half of the tenants—Columbia let water infiltration conditions deteriorate, building code violations persist, and garbage
and debris remain in certain buildings.18 In turn, the decay of those premises was used to substantiate the designation of blight.19
The appellate division ruling in the Kaur case certainly appreciated the
irony of such a result. In what the court perceived to be evidence of agency
bias in favor of Columbia, the court observed that the ESDC delayed making an inquiry into the substandard conditions in Manhattanville until well
after Columbia obtained control over the properties. The court found more
evidence of agency heavy-handedness in the ESDC’s authorization of a
special methodology, slanted in Columbia’s favor, for determining blight.20
The court made plain its displeasure: “Even a cursory examination of the
study reveals the idiocy of considering things like unpainted block walls or
loose awning supports as evidence of a blighted neighborhood. Virtually
every neighborhood in the five boroughs will yield similar instances of disrepair . . . .”21 Still, on appeal, the court allowed the blight designation to
stand.22

15. Id.
16. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11-15, 20 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009) (“It is important to note that the record before ESDC contains no evidence whatsoever
that Manhattanville was blighted prior to Columbia gaining control over the vast majority of
property therein.”), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-ItAway, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
17. Id. at 19 (noting that the 2002 West Harlem Master Plan stated that “not only was
Harlem experiencing a renaissance of economic development, but that the area had great
development potential that could easily be realized through rezoning”).
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 21-22. Columbia had hired an environmental and planning consulting firm,
Allee, King, Rosen and Fleming, Inc. (AKRF) to assist in the planning. The methodology
employed narrowed AKRF’s investigation to highlight blight designations in the report.
21. Id. at 22 (alteration in original).
22. Id. at 24.
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If the public trust is to be upheld, a more meaningful standard of judicial
review must be applied to New York’s eminent domain process. Part I of
this Article sets forth the relevant doctrinal and procedural predicates helpful to an assessment of such a possibility. It examines the mechanisms by
which New York government agencies must abide when exercising the
power of eminent domain. Further, it introduces the relevant provisions of
New York’s Eminent Domain Procedural Law (EDPL)23 as well as the
UDCA, and sets the framework for a comparative approach. Part II explores the devolution of the blight designation in New York into a standardless standard. Against this backdrop, Part III critically considers the
New York courts’ reluctance to second-guess state agency determinations
of blight. It examines the potential for abuse that a posture of wholesale
judicial deference creates. Part IV gleans lessons learned from other jurisdictions, as courts and legislatures have exercised their prerogative in response to Kelo’s invitation to impose public use requirements that are more
stringent than the federal baseline. Finally, Part V sets forth a proposal for
reinvention in New York, whereby a more meaningful standard of judicial
review might be applied when courts evaluate the propriety of legislative
and agency determinations of blight and civic purpose.
I. THE NEW YORK APPROACH TO EMINENT DOMAIN LAW
New York’s eminent domain laws stand alone, representing a broad
grant of takings authority to various enabling agencies. Despite the statutory requirement that a showing of “blight,” or alternatively “civic purpose,”
be established by the given agency to justify the taking, those classifications themselves are broadly inclusive. Courts, in turn, hesitate to secondguess the agency determinations and abide, instead, by a posture of generous deference to government prerogative.
Certainly, as compared to other states’ protocol in a post-Kelo world,
New York’s eminent domain law is anachronistic.24 The mechanism in
place in New York to permit the taking of private property for public use
simply requires an easily satisfied showing of blight or civic purpose. The
New York protocol significantly limits the capacity of affected landowners
to push back against the government’s takings powers, affording affected
parties only thirty days to seek judicial review, or lose that right.25
New York’s government-solicitous approach to takings is peerless.
While requiring that notice be published so that interested landowners

23. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW §§ 101-709 (McKinney 1977).
24. See infra notes 112-39 and accompanying text.
25. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 204 (McKinney 2010).
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might have an opportunity to object at public proceedings, it was not until
2005 that the condemning agency was required to provide actual notice to
those individuals directly affected by the project.26 As noted, if affected
parties fail to seek judicial review within the prescribed thirty-day window,
they are essentially estopped from challenging the condemnation.27 Moreover, as a predicate to seeking judicial review, interested parties must first
attend the public hearing and voice their concerns.28 The scope of judicial
review is limited to the objections made at the hearing.29
New York’s swift and somewhat lopsided approach to justice in eminent
domain matters may be a product of the specific needs of its fast-moving
metropolis, which is rightly deemed a global center of commerce, education, and the arts.30 As the issue was presented in Kaur, the undoubtedly
public purpose of education is particularly vital for New York to maintain
its status as an internationally-renowned and important center of higher
education and academic research.31 Whatever the rationale, stated or subtextual, for the procedures adopted by New York, they are unmatched and
most certainly skewed in favor of the governing agencies.
The EDPL is the state statutory body of law that governs the acquisition
by eminent domain of real property within the state of New York. EDPL
procedure requires the condemning entity to hold a public hearing prior to
the acquisition, and to inform the public of the purpose for the project and
the impact on the environment and residents of the locality.32 Notice of the
public hearing must be given to residents at least ten days, but not more
than thirty days, before the date of the hearing. Such notice must be published in at least five successive issues of both an official daily newspaper
and a newspaper of general circulation.33 Remarkably, until 2005 the condemning agency was not required to notify affected homeowners indivi-

26. See Brody v. Vill. of Port Chester, 509 F. Supp. 2d 269, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
27. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 204 (McKinney 2004).
28. Id. § 202(c)(2).
29. Id.
30. See generally Nasim Farjad, Note, Condemnation Friendly or Land Use Wise? A
Broad Interpretation of the Public Use Requirement Works Well for New York City, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1121, 1161 (2007); Bureau of Int’l Info. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State,
U.S. Cities Reflect Cultural Diversity, Artistic Ingenuity: Regional differences add character
to U.S. Metropolitan Centers, AMERICA.GOV (Dec. 13, 2007), http://www.america.gov/st/
peopleplace-english/2007/December/20071213194500GLnesnoM0.4935419.html.
31. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 734 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
32. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 201 (McKinney 1982).
33. Id. However, if only weekly publications are available, it must be published in at
least two successive issues.
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dually.34 Finally, in 2005, the EDPL was amended to require that the
record billing owner be given notice by certified mail within the same statutorily prescribed time frame.35
The notice afforded affected owners must “clearly state that those property owners who may subsequently wish to challenge condemnation of
their property via judicial review may do so only on the basis of issues,
facts, and objections raised at such hearing.”36 Hence, well in advance of
the project’s launch date, the landowner must attend the public hearing, determine any present or future objections that he or she may wish to raise,
and raise such objections. At the hearing, the proponent of the project must
outline its purpose, proposed location, any alternative locations, and any
other information that it deems pertinent.37 Thereafter, any person in attendance is to be given a “reasonable opportunity” to present an oral or
written statement regarding the project.38 While that provision provides
objecting residents an opportunity to be heard, the condemning agency is
not obliged to address their complaints, or even to take them into consideration when rendering its determinations.
The Institute for Justice found that, at the requisite public hearings, officials are neither required to answer questions from property owners nor to
provide them with relevant supporting documents or the opportunity to directly challenge the government’s evidence.39 It has been posited that private interest groups as well as local governments routinely inflate the “public good” that the given project will advance mindful that, once the
property is condemned, there is no concomitant governmental obligation to
produce evidence of the alleged economic gains that were used to justify
the condemnation in the first place.40 Further, the statutorily prescribed
“reasonable opportunity” to be heard is an ambiguous term that has not
been defined by the legislature or the courts, leaving considerable room for
circumvention.
The EDPL requires that, within ninety days of the public meeting, the
agency must complete its determinations and findings concerning the pro-

34. See Brody v. Vill. of Port Chester, 509 F. Supp. 2d 269, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
35. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 202 (McKinney 2004).
36. Id. § 202(c)(2).
37. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 203 (McKinney 1982).
38. Id.
39. Empire State Eminent Domain: Robin Hood in Reverse, INST. OF JUSTICE (Jan.
2010),
http://www.ij.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3045&Itemid=
165 (referencing Dick Carpenter & John K. Ross, Robin Hood in Reverse, CITY JOURNAL,
Jan. 15, 2010, available at http://www.city-journal.org/2010/eon0115dcjr.html).
40. Id.
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posed public project.41 It is obliged to publish a brief synopsis, in at least
two successive issues of a generally circulated newspaper, to indicate the
public use, benefit, or purpose to be served by the project, the environmental effects, and the reasons for the selection of the particular location.42
The agency is also required, upon written request, to provide a written copy
of its determination and findings.43 Once officials approve the statement of
“Determination and Findings,” property owners have thirty days to sue to
contest the findings.44
Significantly, New York is one of only a few states to require property
owners to file a lawsuit before officials move to condemn.45 If property
owners miss the thirty day window, they permanently lose the right to object to the blight finding and to challenge an eventual condemnation.46 As
noted, until 2005 officials were not obliged to inform property owners that
their property was targeted for redevelopment—thus the thirty day window
would expire before property owners even knew they had to act.47
When property owners do attempt to defend their property, judicial review is limited to the transcript of the public hearing. The court can either
confirm or reject the determinations, and may review whether: (1) the proceeding was in conformity with state and federal constitutions; (2) the proposed acquisition was within the condemning agency’s statutory jurisdiction or authority; (3) the determinations were made in accordance with
statutory requirements; and (4) a public use, benefit, or purpose will be
served by the proposed acquisition.48 Subsequent to the publication of its
determinations and findings, the condemning agency has the right to amend
the proposed project when further study of field conditions so warrants.
The procedural protocol allows for amendment without requiring additional
publication.49
As a procedural matter (and setting aside for present purposes the wide
swath of discretion afforded the condemning agency with respect to the
substantive determination of blight), the EDPL is not particularly solicitous
of private property rights. From affording affected landowners only thirty
days to seek judicial review (or lose the right), to limiting judicial review to
those objections raised at public hearing, to creating a parade of exemp41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 204 (McKinney 2004).
Id. § 204(A).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 207 (amended 1991).
N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 205 (amended 1977).
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tions regarding agency compliance with the procedural protocol, the procedural regime is less than generous to the targets of agency action. The procedural safeguards are waived if the agency, for example, obtains a license
permit or certificate of public convenience from a state, federal, or local
government agency, obtains a certificate of environmental compatibility
and public need pursuant to the public service law, or undergoes or purports to undergo prior to acquisition one or more public hearings.50
In conjunction with the EDPL, takings of private property for public use
are effectuated in accordance with the UDCA. The UDCA creates a corporate governmental agency, known as the New York State Urban Development Corporation (“UDC”), which is granted the authority to “acquire,
construct, reconstruct, rehabilitate or improve such industrial, manufacturing, commercial, educational, recreational and cultural facilities . . . and to
carry out the clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of
such substandard and insanitary areas.”51 The UDCA permits the UDC to
exercise eminent domain for land use projects and civic projects.
Under the UDCA, a land use project is defined as “[a] plan or undertaking for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction, and rehabilitation . . . of a
substandard and insanitary area, and for recreational or other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto, pursuant to and in accordance with article
eighteen of the constitution and this act.”52 The UDC must find that the
area in which the land improvement project is to be located is “substandard
or insanitary” or is in danger of becoming such, and “tends to impair or arrest the sound growth and development of the municipality.”53 “Substandard or insanitary” is interchangeable with “a slum, blighted, deteriorated
or deteriorating area or an area which has a blighting influence on the surrounding area.”54 No further guidance on the meaning of the term “blight”
is offered by the UDCA itself.
II. “BLIGHT” AS A STANDARDLESS STANDARD
After conducting research on New York’s eminent domain protocol, the
Institute for Justice published findings that chronicle the ease with which
blight designations are made. The blight designation can be affixed to any
neighborhood “in need of redevelopment.”55 That designation, in turn, can
rest on such dubious grounds as “outmoded design,” the “lack of suitable
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 206 (amended 1978).
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6252 (McKinney 2011).
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6253(6)(c) (McKinney 2009).
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6260(c)(1) (McKinney 2011).
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6253(12) (McKinney 2009).
Carpenter & Ross, supra note 39.
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off-street parking,” or the danger that the area might become “substandard
or insanitary.”56 Municipalities have enough latitude to wield the blight
stamp so that “virtually any property fits the bill,” and courts in turn rarely
scrutinize those blight designations.57
In Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,58 the Atlantic
Yards case, New York’s highest court approved the seizure of what dissenting Judge Robert Smith called a “normal and pleasant residential community.”59 In that case, the ESDC sought to use its eminent domain power
to undertake a “mixed-use development” that was proposed by private developer FCRC, for the benefit of that developer.60 The project sought to
condemn private property in order to make way for the construction of a
sports arena to house the NBA Nets franchise.61 Petitioners, affected private property owners, alleged that the land at issue was not in fact blighted.
The New York Court of Appeals responded that “[t]hey are doubtless correct that the conditions cited in support of the blight finding at issue do not
begin to approach in severity the dire circumstances of urban slum dwelling
described by the Muller court in 1936.”62
Yet, in Goldstein, instead of reviewing the record to assess the propriety
of the blight designation, the court chose to defer wholesale to the agency’s
determination. It concluded that “[i]t is only where there is no room for
reasonable difference of opinion as to whether an area is blighted, that
judges may substitute their views as to the adequacy with which the public
purpose of blight removal has been made out for those of the legislatively
designated agencies . . . .”63 Further, the court determined that once the
legislative agency has made its findings, absent a showing of corruption or
irrationality, “there is nothing for the courts to do about it.”64
Similarly, the concurrence in Kaur took considerable issue with the
blight classification, but felt compelled to vote with the majority because of
the weight of precedent.65 The court’s endorsement of the findings of
blight, despite the evidence that the private entity receiving the benefits of

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
59. Id. at 190 (Smith, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 166.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 171; see also N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936) (developing the blight exception to the public use doctrine).
63. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172.
64. Id.
65. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub
nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
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that classification, Columbia University, wielded a heavy hand in influencing the determination of blight, makes plainer the extent of the New York
judiciary’s wholesale deference to agency determinations of blight.66 Prior
to the ESDC’s conclusion that the area in question was “blighted,” West
Harlem was not in a depressed economic condition.67 To the contrary, “the
2002 West Harlem Master Plan stated that not only was Harlem experiencing a renaissance of economic development, but that the area had great development potential that could easily be realized through rezoning.”68 Factors that led to the area’s designation as blighted included the presence of
unpainted block walls, loose awning supports, and sidewalk and building
defects.69 Significantly, the ESDC study substantiating the characterization
of blight failed to include vital considerations such as an analysis of real
estate values, rental demand, rezoning applications, and prior proposals for
development of the waterfront area.70
Goldstein and Kaur demonstrate just how expansively the blight designation has been construed and applied in New York. The hollowness of the
blight classification renders vulnerable any area where economic development could be increased. Certainly, “[a] sufficiently expansive definition
of blight is essentially equivalent to authorizing economic development
takings.”71
To solidify a government’s capability to essentially effectuate takings at
will, the New York statutory scheme authorizes condemnations not only to
remediate “blight,” however broadly conceived, but also to advance “civic
projects.”72 A “civic project” is defined as “[a] project or that portion of a
multi-purpose project designed and intended for the purpose of providing
facilities for educational, cultural, recreational, community, municipal,
public service or other civic purposes.”73 As a result, the “civic project”
classification serves as a catch-all and back-up plan, in the unlikely event
that government is unsuccessful at deeming an area “blighted.” In Kaur,
66. Ilya Somin, New York High Court Upholds Columbia University Takings, THE VOCONSPIRACY (June 24, 2010), http://volokh.com.category/2010/06/24/new-york-highcourt-upholds-columbia-university-takings/.
67. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009),
rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 22.
70. Id.
71. See Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings
After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 266 (2007) (alteration in original).
72. N.Y. URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ACT 174/68 § 3(6)(d) (2006) (alteration
in original).
73. Id.

LOKH
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the New York Court of Appeals went so far as to approve the ESDC’s alternative classification of Columbia’s plans for expansion as a “civic
project.”74 Its willingness to defer to the agency’s determinations is made
even plainer when it notes that, “[o]f course, ESDC is statutorily empowered to exercise eminent domain in furtherance of a civic project regardless of whether a project site suffers from blight.”75
III. A BLIND DEFERENCE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE: THE NEW
YORK COURTS’ RELUCTANCE TO SECOND-GUESS AGENCY
DETERMINATIONS
On the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted emphatically that
“[t]he role of the judiciary in determining whether [the eminent domain]
power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow
one.”76 In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court found that “[C]ongress
and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for [the Court] to reappraise
them.”77 Certainly, courts are not in a position to “oversee the choice of
the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project
area.”78 Rather, once the matter of public purpose has been resolved, “the
amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a
particular tract to complete the integrated plan rest in the discretion of the
legislative branch.”79 Likewise, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,80
the Supreme Court determined that the “public use” requirement is coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police power.81 The Court made
clear that it would not substitute its judgment for the legislature’s judgment
as to what constitutes a public use unless the use in question is “palpably
without reasonable foundation.”82
In Kelo v. City of New London,83 the Court found itself confronted with
the question of “whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public pur-

74. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 733 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
75. Id.
76. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (alteration in original).
77. Id. at 33 (alteration in original).
78. Id. at 36.
79. Id. at 35-36 (alteration in original).
80. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
81. Id. at 240.
82. Id. at 241 (alteration in original).
83. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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pose.’”84 The Court acknowledged that, without exception, precedent defined the public purpose construct broadly, reflecting a longstanding policy
of deference to legislative judgments in the field.85 Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, noted that “our earliest cases in particular embodied a
strong theme of federalism, emphasizing the ‘great respect’ that we owe to
state legislatures and state courts in discerning local public needs.”86 For
more than a century, the jurisprudence governing public use “widely
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of
the takings power.”87 Those policies form the bedrock for much of the Supreme Court’s approach to determinations of blight.
On the other hand, the Court has made plain that even a rational basis
standard of review must have teeth. In his concurrence in Kelo, Justice
Kennedy stated that “[a] court applying rational-basis review under the
Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is
intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.”88 Meaningful rational basis review requires that
courts conduct an extensive inquiry into primary and incidental benefit.89
Even more significantly, the traditional presumption of validity may not
apply to a more narrowly drawn category of takings. “There may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected, impermissible favoritism of
private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of
invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.”90
Thus, Kelo itself suggests a basis for considered judicial review when
the condemnation is motivated by private economic interests.91 Certainly,
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in that case placed particular emphasis on
review of the motivations to attend the underlying planning process that ultimately called for the exercise of the takings power.92 He acknowledged
that an acute inference of impermissible preferential treatment could well
warrant the presumption that the private transfer itself is invalid. 93

84. Id. at 480 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680
(1896)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 482.
87. Id. at 483.
88. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
89. See id.
90. Id. at 493.
91. See Charles E. Cohen, The Abstruse Science: Kelo, Lochner, and Representation
Reinforcement in the Public Use Debate, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 375, 412-13 (2008).
92. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 493.
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The New York judiciary’s insistence on wholesale deference to legislative and agency determinations of blight, particularly in Kaur, misses this
call. If Kaur does not provide an object lesson on impermissible favoritism, what does? Columbia was both the architect and beneficiary of the
blight designation. The court repeatedly recognized that “the record before
ESDC contains no evidence whatsoever that Manhattanville was blighted
prior to Columbia gaining control over the vast majority of the property
therein.”94 After Columbia began acquiring the property in question, the
ESDC made no further attempts to independently ascertain that the conditions in the area were blighted until March 2006, four years after the West
Harlem study found that while the area could be revitalized through rezoning, it was not blighted.95 ESDC’s inexplicable delay in assessing the
property until long after Columbia had established control over it, as well
as Columbia’s intentional dereliction, raise a credible, if not acute inference
that the blight designation was manipulated to impermissibly favor a private actor.96 Examples of this behavior include permitting water infiltration conditions to go unaddressed and letting building code and local ordinance violations pile up.97
If rational basis review is to have meaning, the New York judiciary must
reclaim its role as a meaningful check on the coordinating branches.
Somehow, in New York, deference has devolved into wholesale surrender
of the judicial role. Certainly, history in New York shows that judicial restraint is not meant to be judicial abdication.
While the New York courts have long recognized that the extensive authority to make initial blight determinations is vested in agencies and municipalities, even limited judicial review has traditionally been construed to
require more than a perfunctory review of the record below.98 Certainly,
the governing statute vests duly designated municipal officials with discretion in the designation and selection of substandard areas,99 and courts may
review those findings only upon a limited basis.100 That review, however,
has meant more than a mere rubber stamp.
94. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 16 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009), rev’d, 933 N.E. 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y.
State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
95. Id. at 16-17.
96. Id. at 21.
97. Id.
98. See generally Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975);
Ziegler v. Chapin, 27 N.E. 471 (N.Y. 1891); Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y.
1953).
99. Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d at 332-33 (finding that the record showed a substantial factual
basis to find the area involved substandard).
100. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y. 2009).
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For example, in 1953, the plaintiff in Kaskel disputed the conclusion of
various qualified public bodies and officers that the area in question, in
Manhattan, was, in fact, substandard and insanitary.101 The court carefully
reviewed the record and found that there was ample evidence to justify the
determination of the city planning commission that a substantial part of the
area in question was substandard and insanitary.102 Nothing in the record
could sustain a finding of corruption, irrationality, or baselessness.103
Later, in Talcott v. Buffalo,104 the court noted that a posture of judicial
deference with respect to matters within the discretion of local officers and
municipal bodies facilitates aims of efficiency and recognizes the wisdom
of the political process:
Whatever evils may exist in the government of cities, that are due to mistakes, errors of judgment, or the lack of intelligent appreciation of official
duty, must necessarily be temporary, compared with the mischief and inconvenience which judicial supervision, in all cases, would ultimately
produce. Local officers are elected or appointed for such brief periods
that frequent opportunity is afforded to the public and the taxpayers interested in their official acts to change them and substitute others in their
place.105

The capacity, however, to “vote out” those in charge is not available under the present statutory scheme for takings in New York. Members of the
governing agency are neither popularly elected nor readily susceptible to
the checks that transparency and accountability would otherwise provide.106 Particularly here, courts must reemerge as meaningful checks on
“the lack of intelligent appreciation of official duty.”107
New York’s own jurisprudence concedes this role for the courts. In
Yonkers, the court held that:
[C]ourts are required to be more than rubber stamps in the determination
of the existence of substandard conditions in urban renewal condemnation
cases. The findings of the agency are not self-executing. A determination

101. Kaskel, 115 N.E.2d at 661.
102. See id. at 662.
103. See id.
104. 26 N.E. 263, 264-65 (N.Y. 1890).
105. Id. at 265.
106. See generally Paula A. Franzese & Daniel J. O’Hern, Restoring the Public Trust: An
Agenda for Ethics Reform of State Government and a Proposed Model for New Jersey, 57
RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2005) (exalting the aims of transparency and accountability as
cornerstones of good government).
107. Talcott, 26 N.E. at 265.
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of public purpose must be made by the courts themselves and they must
have a basis on which to do so.108

Yet, in Goldstein, New York’s highest court reasoned that “[t]he Constitution accords government broad power to take and clear substandard and
insanitary areas for redevelopment. In doing so, it commensurately deprives the Judiciary of grounds to interfere with the exercise.”109 In that
case, the ESDC sought to obtain, through the use of eminent domain, certain privately owned property in downtown Brooklyn for inclusion in a
land use improvement project known as Atlantic Yards. The project was to
be accomplished by a private developer. Certain landowners objected to
the taking as a violation of the state constitution, which requires the use of
eminent domain only for a public purpose. The Court of Appeals determined that eradicating blight from an area is a sufficient public purpose to
comply with the constitutional requirement.110
The Goldstein court noted the potential for abuse that an expansive conceptualization of blight can wield, but opted to leave that concern to the
legislature.
It may be that the bar has now been set too low—that what will now pass
as ‘blight,’ as that expression has come to be understood . . . should not be
permitted to constitute a predicate for the invasion of property rights and
the razing of homes and business. But any such limitation upon the sovereign power of eminent domain as it has come to be defined in the urban
renewal context is a matter for the Legislature, not the courts.111

For courts to yield the floor wholesale because statutory reform is within
the purview of the popularly elected branches begs the question. In both
Goldstein and Kaur, New York’s highest court missed the opportunity to
exercise appropriately its own authority, certainly within the province of
the judiciary, to review the records below to determine whether they could
support the blight designation in the first place. Even a posture of judicial
deference to the coordinating branches of government accommodates,
rightly so, room for courts to serve as a check on the potential for abuse.
Otherwise, the constitutional guarantees are eviscerated. A comparative
assessment of the experiences of other jurisdictions, together with an examination of New York’s own earlier precedent, makes plain that courts
must have a voice in the evolving colloquy on blight.

108.
109.
110.
111.

Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 333 (N.Y. 1975).
Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 173 (N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 172.
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE: STATUTORY REFORM EFFORTS
IN A POST-KELO NATION
Kelo inspired a veritable national backlash, as states accepted Justice
Stevens’ invitation in that case to “impose ‘public use’ requirements that
are stricter than the federal baseline.”112 Those more stringent safeguards
against government abuse have come largely as a consequence of legislative reform. Most states have modified or crafted eminent domain statutes
that narrow and more carefully prescribe the appropriate grounds for exercise of the takings power.113 Others have used state constitutional law to
derive meaningful limitations on the use of eminent domain for economic
development.114 Still others have passed constitutional amendments rendering takings for economic revitalization impermissible.115
As further evidence of the public’s post-Kelo engagement with the issue
of eminent domain, in the November 2006 elections voters in ten states approved ballot measures that restricted government takings powers.116 PostKelo legislation banned takings for economic redevelopment, barred postcondemnation transfers to private parties, or both.117 Recognizing states’
capacity to more stridently narrow the reach of governmental takings, thenJudge Roberts opined during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings that
“legislative bodies in the states [possess the power to] protect [citizens of
those states] . . . where the Court has determined, as it did 5-4 in Kelo, that
[it is] not going to draw that line.”118
The Florida legislature enacted one of the more, if not the most, stringent
set of post-Kelo restrictions on government authority to exercise its powers
of eminent domain.119 On its face, the Florida Constitution contains a
broad rendering of the takings power, sanctioning condemnations for “pub-

112. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
113. See ALA. CODE § 24-2-2 (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.013(1) (West 2006); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.540 (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271(1) (West 2002); 35 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (West 1997).
114. See Gallenthin v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 465 (N.J. 2007).
115. See Alberto B. Lopez, Revisiting Kelo and Eminent Domain’s “Summer of Scrutiny,” 59 ALA. L. REV. 561, 591 (2008) (noting that Louisiana and South Carolina have resorted to constitutional amendment to reform takings law).
116. Id. at 601; see also Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Property Rights Issues on the
2006 Ballot, NCSL (Nov. 12, 2006), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17595 (noting
that Louisiana’s measure received fifty-five percent of the vote while South Carolina’s
measure received eighty-six percent of the vote).
117. See ALA. CODE § 24-2-2; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.013(1); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
416.540; MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271(1); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702.
118. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United Sates: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 286 (2005).
119. Lopez, supra note 115, at 591-92.
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lic purpose.”120 However, despite claims that they would “hinder the revitalization of inner cities,” Florida’s legislative amendments now bar governmental agencies from using the takings power to convey property “to a
natural person or private entity.”121 Not satisfied with that barrier, Florida
went one step further, legislatively prohibiting the exercise of eminent domain “for the purpose of abating or eliminating a public nuisance” or “for
the purpose of preventing or eliminating slum or blight conditions.”122
Missouri modified its eminent domain statutes so that “[n]o condemning
authority shall acquire private property through the process of eminent domain for solely economic development purposes.”123 “Economic development” purposes include measures intended to increase the “tax base, tax
revenues, employment, and general economic health.”124 Similarly, Kentucky decided to completely strike the word “purpose” from its eminent
domain statutes.125 Thus, takings are now limited to those for “public
use.”126 In turn, the Kentucky legislature determined that “no provision in
the law of the Commonwealth shall be construed to authorize the condemnation of private property for transfer to a private owner for the purpose of
economic development that benefits the general public only indirectly.”127
Still, neither Missouri nor Kentucky prohibits exercise of the takings power
to eliminate “blighted areas or substandard and unsanitary areas.”128
Both Pennsylvania and Alabama have “redefined . . . ‘blight’ for condemnation purposes . . . to reduce the number of properties eligible for acquisition.”129 “Pennsylvania . . . modified the definition of blight as set
forth in its Urban Redevelopment Law, which was enacted in 1945.”130
The . . . statute defined ‘blight’ by reference to seven factors: (1) unsafe,
unsanitary, inadequate or over-crowded conditions of the houses in the
particular area; (2) inadequate planning in the area; (3) excessive land
coverage by the buildings in the area; (4) lack of adequate light and air
and open space; (5) the defective design and arrangement of the buildings
120. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a) (1968) (declaring that “no private property shall be taken
except for a public purpose and with full compensation”).
121. Lopez, supra note 115, at 591-92.
122. See id. at 592.
123. MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271(1) (West 2002).
124. Id. § 523.271(2).
125. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.540 (West 2005).
126. Id. Kentucky redefined “condemn” as taking private property for a “public use”
(formerly “purpose”) pursuant to eminent domain, and redefined eminent domain as the
“right of the Commonwealth to take for a public use” (formerly “purpose”).
127. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(3) (West 2005).
128. MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271(2) (West 2002); see also Lopez, supra note 115, at 593.
129. Lopez, supra note 115, at 593.
130. Id.; see also 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (West 1997).
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in the area; (6) faulty street layout; or (7) land uses in the area which are
economically or socially undesirable.131

In response to Kelo, Pennsylvania’s statute now restricts the blight designation to any one of a series of factors aimed at curtailing unbridled discretion in the hands of state and local government.132 The list of circumstances capable of sustaining the blight designation include those locations
that constitute a “public nuisance at common law,” an “attractive nuisance
to children,” buildings that are “vermin infested,” lots or parcels that are “a
haven for rodents,” or properties classified as “abandoned.”133
Alabama resorted to a similar approach when redefining blight in the aftermath of Kelo.134 The statute now defines “blighted property” as portions
of the community with “buildings, or improvements, which, because of dilapidation, deterioration or unsanitary or unsafe conditions, vacancy or abandonment, neglect or lack of maintenance, inadequate provision of ventilation, light, air, sanitation, vermin infestation, or lack of necessary
facilities and equipment, are unfit for human habitation or occupancy.”135
By contrast, takings of less than blighted areas for purposes of urban renewal are not permitted without owner consent.136
Even those reform efforts, however, are not without their detractors.
Legislative attempts at redefining blight have been criticized as vague and
less than adequate for purposes of protecting against governmental overreaching.137 Given the definitional vagaries that permeate much of the
post-Kelo legislation, critics contend that reform efforts tend to do little
more than “preserve the status quo.”138 Some maintain that legislatures for
the most part opted for measures that barred the specific exercises of eminent domain that incited the anti-Kelo outcry without remediating the real

131. Lopez, supra note 115, at 593; see also 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1702(a).
132. See Property Rights Protection Act, 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 205(b)(1)-(12) (2006).
133. Id.
134. ALA. CODE § 24-2-2 (2010).
135. Id. § 24-2-2(c)(1).
136. Id. § 24-2-2(b).
137. See Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful
Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709, 725 (stating that “[d]efinitions of
‘blight’ are generally vague enough to allow condemnation of almost any property”); Somin, supra note 71 (commenting that “[a] sufficiently expansive definition of blight is essentially equivalent to authorizing economic development takings”).
138. Lopez, supra note 115, at 594 (citing David Barron, Eminent Domain is Dead!
(Long Live Eminent Domain!), BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2006, at D1 (characterizing post-Kelo
reforms as having “more bark than bite”)); see also Terry Pristin, Voters Back Limits on
Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at C6 (reporting that “[e]minent domain specialists on both sides . . . say many of the statutes enacted by state legislatures have few
teeth”).
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potential for government misuse of the blight designation.139 These legislative deficiencies suggest that, even in the presence of statutory reform efforts, courts have a role to play in protecting against such abuse.
V. PUTTING SOME MUSCLE BACK INTO JUDICIAL REVIEW:
REINVENTION IN NEW YORK
While judicial deference can and has served salutary ends when it comes
to legislative agency determinations of blight, a posture of judicial restraint
must not be reduced to one of blind deference. Wholesale judicial rubber
stamping of the coordinating branches’ prerogatives is ill-advised for a host
of reasons. There must be a more meaningful role for the courts when
called upon to adjudicate those matters that transcend the interests of the
litigants themselves. Such cases, often implicating a mix of individual and
societal interests, may well render inescapable judicial balancing of public
policy considerations. This recognition is particularly compelling in takings cases, where the interests at stake implicate both the individual and the
collective interests of the community.
Certainly, a government’s redevelopment authority cannot be unfettered.
Courts have a role to play in assuring that the appropriate balance is struck
between the means and ends of redevelopment and the rights of property
owners. The national experience reveals that courts are capable of discharging this role fairly. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court, refusing to
rubber stamp government designations of land as “deteriorating,” deemed
that classification a “standardless standard.”140 In the court’s estimation,
Ohio’s statutory scheme does not afford fair notice to property owners and
invites “ad hoc and selective enforcement.”141
While applying a rational basis standard of review, the Ohio courts recognize that even limited judicial scrutiny “remains a critical constitutional
component.”142 Significantly, the court emphasized that the judiciary’s
“independence is critical, particularly when the authority for the taking is
delegated to another or the contemplated public use is dependent on a private entity.”143 Particularly in those instances in which the state takes pri-

139. See John E. Kramer & Lisa Knepper, One Year After Kelo Argument National
Property Rights Revolt Still Going Strong: 43 State Legislatures Work Toward Eminent
Domain Reform, INST. FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.ij.org/index.php?option
=com_content&task+view&id=933&Itemid=165.
140. City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1145 (Ohio 2006).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1138.
143. Id. at 1139.
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vate property and transfers it to another private person or entity, “judicial
review of the taking is paramount.”144
Perhaps most relevant to reform of the New York model is the experience just across the Hudson River, in New Jersey. Recently, in Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, the New Jersey
Supreme Court determined that, as a matter of state constitutional law,
government designations of blight must rest upon “substantial evidence.”145
Moreover, the court interpreted the New Jersey Local Redevelopment and
Housing Law to bar the designation of blight when, in the estimation of the
local planning board, the parcel in question is deemed merely “stagnant or
not fully productive.”146
While affording the New Jersey statutory scheme the presumption of
constitutionality and considerable deference, and “recogniz[ing] that government redevelopment is a valuable tool for municipalities faced with
economic deterioration in their communities[,]”147 the court in Gallenthin
did not hesitate to scrutinize the record to gauge the integrity of the municipality’s blight designation. Judicial deference must mean more, the court
tacitly observed, than judicial endorsement of a record that contains essentially “a bland recitation of applicable statutory criteria and a declaration
that those criteria are met.”148 Rather, “municipal redevelopment designations are entitled to deference provided that they are supported by substantial evidence on the record.”149 In Gallethin, the court held that the substantial evidence standard was not met, mindful that the municipality’s
decision was supported “by only the net opinion of an expert.”150
The New Jersey Supreme Court derived its authority to impose a meaningful check on government’s exercise of its redevelopment powers from
the state’s constitution. The relevant constitutional provisions restrict redevelopment to “blighted areas.”151 Intended to strike a “balance between
municipal redevelopment and property owners’ rights,” the blight showing
mandated by the constitution could not be sustained, the court determined
“solely because the property is not used in an optimal manner.” 152
Significantly, New Jersey’s constitutional provisions on blight are quite
similar to those contained in the New York Constitution. New Jersey’s
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
924 A.2d 447, 465 (N.J. 2007).
Id. at 458-65.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id.
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 1 (1947).
Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 465.
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blighted areas clause decrees that “[t]he clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment of blighted areas shall be a public purpose and public use, for which private property may be taken or acquired.”153 Correspondingly, New York’s relevant constitutional provision indicates that “the
legislature may provide . . . for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction
and rehabilitation of substandard and insanitary areas.”154 Yet, notwithstanding the comparable enabling grants, the New Jersey courts have put
some steel into the blight conceptualization, while the recent pronouncements of the New York judiciary, in Goldstein and Kaur, reveal a considerable disinclination to do the same.
In Gallenthin, the New Jersey court noted that blight “presumes deterioration or stagnation that negatively affects surrounding areas.”155 By contrast, property cannot constitutionally be deemed “in need of redevelopment” simply because it is “not fully productive.”156 The court saw fit to
review the record below, and found that it could not support the redevelopment designation by substantial evidence.157 The government’s reliance
on the conclusions of one expert—that the area in question was unimproved, partially vacant, and not optimally utilized—was deemed inadequate.158
The government’s capacity to issue a designation of blight on the basis
of underutilization is fiercely problematic. The court in Kaur endeavored
to explain that “[t]he theoretical justification for using the degree of utilization of development rights as an indicator of blight is the inference that it
reflects owners’ inability to make profitable use of full development rights
due to lack of demand.”159 This rather self-serving rationalization renders
any property, which the government finds less than optimally operated,
susceptible to the takings power. The Kaur court acknowledged that “[i]f
such an all-encompassing definition of ‘blight’ were adopted, most property in the State would be eligible for redevelopment.”160
The potential, in Justice Kennedy’s lexicon, for “impermissible favoritism of private parties”161 is particularly acute when a government agency is

153. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 1 (1947).
154. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (amended 1965).
155. Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 457.
156. Id. at 449.
157. See id. at 449-54, 464-65.
158. See id. at 464.
159. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 22 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d,
933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban
Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
160. Id. at 23 (quoting Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 460).
161. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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allowed to decide property ownership based on its own opinion of who or
what would put the land to a more productive or attractive use. Moreover,
“the bundle of sticks” that those of us who teach property law use as a metaphor to describe the cadre of rights and duties that ownership contemplates, including the owner’s prerogative to use, or not use, to the exclusion
of others, would fall away if government were to become arbiter and referee of productivity.
Mindful of the Gallenthin court’s concerns with respect to the adequacy
of the record, the record in Kaur reveals that no comprehensive development plan was ever created. Moreover, the situs of government’s reach,
West Harlem, “was not in a depressed economic condition” at the time that
the EDC and ESDC embarked on their mission to find blight.162 Most significantly, the private party to reap the benefits of the blight designation,
Columbia University, was the “progenitor of its own benefit.”163 Columbia
University spent years quietly buying up considerable properties that would
come within the scope of its proposed expansion, only to then allow those
properties to fall into disrepair.164 Later, the state of those premises’ decay
was used by the ESDC to substantiate its designation of blight.165
Further, the court in Kaur viewed with some skepticism the characterization of Columbia University’s expansion project as a “civic project.”166
Columbia is the sole beneficiary of the project. At best, “the public benefit
is incrementally incidental to the private benefits” conferred.167 Surely, a
judicial vetting of the propriety of government’s exercise of its takings
powers to transfer private property to another private entity “who will use it
in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public”168 was
warranted.
In Kelo, Justice O’Connor’s dissent sets forth precisely this basic precept
in the following way:
Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so
long as it might be upgraded—i.e. given to an owner who will use it in a

162. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 19 (noting that “[t]he 2002 West Harlem Master Plan stated
that not only was Harlem experiencing a renaissance of economic development, but that the
area had great development potential that could easily be realized through rezoning”).
163. Id. at 20.
164. Id. (“It is important to note that the record before ESDC contains no evidence whatsoever that Manhattanville was blighted prior to Columbia gaining control over the vast majority of property therein.”).
165. Id. at 21.
166. See id. at 23-24.
167. Id. at 24.
168. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public—in the
process. To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits
resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic development takings “for public use” is to wash out any distinction
between private and public use of property—and thereby effectively to
delete the words “for public use” from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.169

Certainly, both the state and federal jurisprudence is rife with emphasis
on judicial deference. In Berman170 and Midkiff,171 the Supreme Court
made plain the significance of deferring to legislative findings about public
purpose. The Court recognized that the judiciary is “ill equipped to evaluate the efficacy of proposed legislative initiatives” and ultimately rejected
as unworkable the concept that courts ought to decide what constitutes a
governmental function. Similarly, Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion
in Kelo concedes the inability of courts to evaluate whether eminent domain is a necessary means to pursue the legislature’s ends.172 However,
Justice O’Connor hastened to add that:
[F]or all the emphasis on deference, Berman and Midkiff hewed to a bedrock principle without which our public use jurisprudence would collapse: “A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the
public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void . . . .”173 To protect that principle, those decisions reserved a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature’s
judgment of what constitutes a public use . . . though the Court in Berman
made clear that it is “an extremely narrow” one.174

Reinvention in New York will depend on the capacity of the courts to
reclaim their place as meaningful actors in a tripartite system of checks and
balances. While the province of the judiciary in passing on the propriety of
government takings is narrow, New York’s own precedent makes plain that
“courts are required to be more than rubber stamps in the determination of
the existence of substandard conditions in urban renewal condemnation
cases. The findings of the agency are not self-executing.”175 The statutory
template specifically allows for judicial review as to whether “the proceedings were in conformity with the federal and state constitutions” and
whether “a public use, benefit, or purpose will be served by the proposed
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 499 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 500 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245).
Id. at 240 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 333 (N.Y. 1975).
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acquisition.”176 Indeed, there is nothing in New York’s enabling grant or
statutory scheme to deny courts the opportunity to assess “whether the
agency’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record that
was before the agency at the time of its decision.”177
The judiciary’s insistence that the blight designation be supported by
substantial evidence in no way usurps the appropriate province of the competing branches of government. The court is not superimposing its judgments onto the legislative scheme, mindful that the governing agency is
presumptively best suited to grappling with the complex economic, social,
political and moral issues involved.178 Nor should the court “impede the
ability of governments to solve holdout and other market failure problems,
as well as to regulate industries through the reassignment of property
rights.”179 Indeed, New York’s use of eminent domain for economic development projects has increased tax revenues, employment opportunities,
and overall neighborhood vitality in a number of vicinages.180
The court, however, does enforce the constitution. To render consideration of the constitutionality of the exercise of the takings power to the political branches is an abdication of that function.181 Particularly in the arena
of economic redevelopment, where untoward influences and “germs of corruption”182 can infect the playing field, courts must assure that the interests
of all property owners are sufficiently safeguarded.183 The responsibility of
the judiciary becomes especially vital in New York because the agency
making the blight classifications is immune to public vote or outcry.184
That New York courts must emerge as relevant actors on the stage of
takings law is made plainer still in view of the less than strident procedural
safeguards in place to protect landowners and the absence in the statutory
text of any meaningful definition of “blight” and “civic purpose.” Mindful
176. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 207 (McKinney 2010).
177. See Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 437 (N.Y. 1986).
178. See Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Property
Rights, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 125-26.
179. See id. at 106.
180. See Farjad, supra note 30, at 1121.
181. See generally James W. Ely, Jr., Can the “Despotic Power” Be Tamed? Reconsidering the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, 17 ABA PROB. & PROP. 31, 36 (2003)
(“Generalized statements as to the necessity for a taking, sometimes veering toward mere
speculation, should not be regarded as adequate.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 891 (1987) (deeming problematic the hollowness of the public use requirement).
182. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON
WRITINGS 1781-82, 245 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (“In every government on earth
[there] is some trace of human weakness, some germ of corruption and degeneracy . . . .”).
183. See Mahoney, supra note 178, at 126.
184. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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that the New York legislature has granted a separate entity the authority to
exercise condemnation proceedings, courts must ensure that the grant of
authority is construed strictly. Doubts over the propriety of the taking
should be resolved in favor of the targeted property owners.185
Courts should require that the blight designation be supported by substantial evidence. At a minimum, the judiciary must engage in more than
perfunctory review of the record below. Certainly, as articulated in the
archives of New York’s own precedent, “even where the law expressly defines the removal or prevention of blight as a public purpose and leaves to
the agencies wide discretion in deciding what constitutes blight, facts supporting such determinations should be spelled out.”186
CONCLUSION
While New York state court precedent has long compelled judicial deference to agency blight determinations, deference must be construed to require more than blind endorsement. This assertion is particularly apt as applied to the New York model, which affords its enabling agencies broad
grants of authority to accomplish takings. Against the backdrop of New
York’s uniquely permissive eminent domain laws, courts must be more
than wholesale abiders of the agency’s will.
When blight designations are allowed to stand unchecked, no matter the
machinations that may have distorted that very characterization, individual
liberties are compromised and the public trust betrayed. The most recent
New York Court of Appeals cases on point, Goldstein and Kaur, demonstrate the ease with which government agencies can justify their actions, no
matter how susceptible the record is to real inferences of manipulation and
heavy-handedness. Particularly then, courts must not yield the floor
wholesale to the wisdom of the political process.
The procedural safeguards advanced by the New York protocol are
anemic at best. In the presence of a largely toothless statutory and regulatory scheme, the public trust depends on a more involved judiciary. A
standard of review that requires that blight determinations be supported by
substantial evidence can protect against infection of the takings process by
privatized actors inescapably motivated by self-interest.
The record amassed in Kaur makes plain that blight findings are susceptible to distortion at the hands of those private interests who have most to
gain from the blight designation. Against this landscape, even the most
modestly applied standard of review obliges courts to do more than defer

185. City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1138 (Ohio 2006).
186. See Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 332 (N.Y. 1975).
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wholesale to the coordinating branches prerogatives. Government must be
put to its proofs, and the build-up to the blight designation must be examined to weed out instances of abuse and manipulation. Courts must demand more than broad descriptions of property as unsanitary or deteriorated. Legislative agencies must be made to justify their determinations
with evidence to show that the blighted conditions truly permeate and are
not self-inflicted.
The heart of our system of checks and balances depends upon a tripartite
model. It is not, by contrast, two and a half branches, or two and a third
branches. To vindicate its role as a full and functional agent, the judiciary
must be rendered more than a rubber stamp, particularly in those matters,
such as takings, that implicate a mix of individual and collective interests.
A meaningful model of judicial review must be allowed to accommodate
the independence, certainly, but also the interdependence of the coordinating branches. Courts must be willing to engage those branches in an exchange that demands a better modicum of accountability. Until then, the
public trust remains vulnerable.

